

# Legacies of Lead – Estimating homebuyer response to lead exposure

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Camp Resources XXIV

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# Overview

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- Lead in homes can create elevated blood lead levels, causing permanent mental and physical problems.
  - Policy responses create stigma/adverse effects.
- How does information disclosure about lead risks capitalize into house prices?
  - Utilize a spatially varying policy in Maryland to estimate effect.
  - Transaction from 2001-2010, two econometric methods.
- Consistent negative capitalization effect present.
  - Clustered in older houses.

# Lead, lead, everywhere...

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- Lead in homes a major environmental hazard and public safety issue.
  - 24 million US homes have elevated lead (CDC, 2013).
  - Estimated 4 million children.
- Adverse health effects of lead.
  - Children – Neurological, behavioral, slowed growth.
  - Pregnant women – damage to fetus.



# Lead, lead, everywhere...

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- Lead in homes from lead-based paints.
  - Banned in 1978.
  - BLLs have since declined significantly.
  - But no “safe” level of lead.
- Increased awareness -> public officials attempt to educate homeowners and provide remediation tools.
- How do homeowners respond to policy?

# Previous literature

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- Some previous work on potential lead exposure risk.
  - Dale et al. (1999) and McCluskey & Rauser (2001, 2003).
    - Dallas smelter.
- Focused on household disclosure of risk.
  - Utilize the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act (Title X).
  - Bae (2016), Zhao (2017) use AHS, find no effect.
    - AHS data based on owner reported price, may be biased (Kiel & Zabel, 1999).

# Research Question

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- I link homebuyer responses to a spatially varying lead risk to estimate how disclosure capitalizes into house prices.
  - How do homebuyers respond when entire areas are designated as a risk for potential lead exposure?
    - Utilize spatially explicit housing transactions.
- Exogenous policy shift in Maryland designated certain zip codes as at-risk areas for lead exposure.
  - All children in zip codes undergo BLL testing at 12 and 24 months.
  - Regardless of age of house.
    - Key point, uniform application of policy

# Policy/Study Setting

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- Maryland very focused on reduction of lead.
  - 55% of all housing units built pre-ban (MDE, 2016),
- In 1997, state law charged DHMH to monitor BLLs.
  - Children under 6 & provide education in at-risk areas.
  - At-risk zip codes in 2000, revision in 2004, whole state in 2016.
    - Predictive statistical model determines risk designation, based on socioeconomic measures across the state.
  - Since program creation, significant successes.
    - Very high BLL ( $+10 \mu\text{g}/\text{dL}$ ) – 3,500 in 2000 to 377 in 2015.
    - High BLL ( $5 \mu\text{g}/\text{dL}$ ) – 18% in 2000 to under 2% in 2015.


# Study Area/Data

- Focus on Baltimore County, Maryland.
  - Suburban county, completely surrounds Baltimore City.
- 86 zip codes in Baltimore County.
  - 25 designated at-risk in 2000.
  - 10 more in 2004.
    - Focus of my work.
- Corelogic housing transactions from 2001-2010.
  - Identify two samples: houses close to at-risk zips and repeat sales.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev
<b>Sale Price</b>	242,700	166,719
<b>House sqft</b>	2,008.30	995.17
<b>Full Baths</b>	1.75	0.74
<b>Parcel</b>	0.30	0.65
<b>Year Built</b>	1969	23.60
<b>Low Quality</b>	0.40	0.49
<b>High Quality</b>	0.004	0.07
<b>Stories</b>	1.80	0.41
<b>Fin base</b>	0.58	0.49
<b>Public Sewer</b>	0.81	0.39








# Empirical Strategy, proximity

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- First empirical method: quasi-experimental DiD hedonic model.
  - Exploit the spatially varying program to build treatment/control groups.

$$\ln Price_{ijt} = f(X_i, N_j, Year_t, \alpha_i, \gamma_i, \theta_i) \quad (1)$$

- $\alpha$  = indicator variable for in at risk zip code.
  - $\gamma$  = indicator variable for sold after policy.
  - $\theta$  = treatment group (interaction of above two variables).
  - Semi-log model.
- Utilize only houses within 0.25 miles of at-risk zip code but in same school district.
  - Allows me to address some sorting concerns.




# Empirical Strategy, repeat sales

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- Second empirical method utilizes a property-fixed effects model (repeat sales).
  - Can control for time-invariant property characteristics.

$$\ln Price_{ijt} = f(X_i, Year_{jt}, \alpha_i, \gamma_i, \theta_i) \quad (2)$$

- $\alpha$  = indicator variable for in at risk zip code.
- $\gamma$  = indicator variable for sold after policy.
- $\theta$  = treatment group (interaction of above two variables).
- Only house characteristic left is “age”.
- Semi-log model.



# Results

Variable	DiD model	PFE model	Old vs. New
<b>Treated Group</b>	-0.015** (0.0057)	-0.05*** (0.012)	-
<b>Old houses (pre-ban)</b>	-	-	-0.0511* (0.024)
<b>New houses (post-ban)</b>	-	-	-0.0271 (0.025)
<b>N</b>	29,611	33,950	29,611
<b>Fixed Effects</b>	School District & Year	Tract by Year	School District & Year

\*p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. clustered standard errors reported in parentheses.

- Small but significant price effect for at-risk houses.
  - Monetary terms, \$3,600 to \$11,800.
  - Estimates in the same range of Mastromonaco (2015).
  - Effect falls mostly on older houses (built before lead ban).

# Robustness Results

Variable	Sales?	Placebo	Full County
<b>Treated Group</b>	-0.102 (0.508)	-0.005 (0.0096)	-0.0411** (0.0077)
<b>N</b>	482	29,611	108,268
<b>Fixed Effects</b>	Year by School District	School District & Year	School District & Year

\*p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. clustered standard errors reported in parentheses.

- However, what if something else is driving the results?
  - At-risk designation makes concerned homeowners (parents) want to move.
  - Log of yearly sales by zip code Muehlenbachs et al. (2015).
- Placebo test insignificant.
- Full county results mirror previous findings.



# Key Findings & Future Work

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- Strong evidence of a capitalization effect from the disclosure of lead risk.
  - Robust to alternative explanations and modelling choice.
- Evidence of unintended consequences from important environmental/public health policy.
- Loss of tax revenue for Baltimore County ~\$1.7 million.
  - But how do we measure the benefits?
  - Estimates of “cost of lead” \$0.5 million per year.
    - Special education, court costs.
- Future work
  - Expand analysis statewide.
  - Examine developer side.