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Bio-economic model of spatial fishery management in developing countries

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Introduction and objectives

- There are spatial dimensions to natural resource abundance.
- Sound management of spatial aspects is required for response diversity & ecosystem resilience.
- Objective: build a bio-economic model to analyze spatial interaction between domestic (i.e. inshore) fisheries and fleets from DWFNs (i.e. offshore) under UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).



The Model in Brief-I

- Basic framework
 - No harvest offshore

- An extension of the basic framework
 - Harvest offshore (under iso-perimetric constraint)
 - Offshore fisheries problem



Some selected results

- **Result One:** Optimum steady state stock in inshore

$$d^* = \frac{1}{2} r$$

- **Result Two:** Spatial fisheries management policies:

- *Landing tax for Natural Marine Reserve Offshore*

$$\tau^* = \begin{cases} 1 \\ (dp - pr + \sigma_2 r)(pd - pr)^{-1} \end{cases}$$

- *Landing tax for Sustainable fisheries Offshore*

$$\tau^* = \frac{\sigma_1 dh_1^*}{px_1^{**2} (\delta - r + 2rx_1^{**}) (2rx_2^{**} + \delta + d - r)}$$



An illustration

- EEZ of Ghana
- Granger causality tests on 3 commercial species:
 - Round sardinella – causality from offshore
 - Flat Sardinella – causality from offshore
 - Chub mackerel – bi-directional causality
- Back-of-envelope computation of optimum landing tax: about 16%.



Conclusion

- Spatial externalities exist under the UNCLOS.
- The landing tax that internalizes the spatial externality depends on biological factors as well as socio-economic factors.