# Environmental Tax Interaction Research: Past, Present, & Future

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Camp Resources 8/13/09

## Overview

- 1) Review of the Tax Interaction Literature
- 2) Why I Don't Like "The Double Dividend"
- 3) Promising Avenues for Tax Interaction Research

#### The Double Dividend

- -Early papers (Tullock, Terkla, Pearce, Oates, Nordhaus, others) point out that environmental taxes raise revenue that can then be used to finance cuts in preexisting distortionary taxes (e.g., income tax)
- -Papers argue that this creates a "Double Dividend":
  - (1) Environmental tax reduces pollution
  - (2) Cutting other taxes reduces excess burden from those taxes

Claim: because of this double dividend, environmental taxes would still be beneficial even if pollution turns out to be harmless

#### The Tax-Interaction Effect

- -Subsequent papers (Bovenberg & De Mooij, Goulder, Parry) point out that higher consumption good prices discourage labor supply, and this increases excess burden from pre-existing taxes on labor
- -This effect is termed the "tax-interaction (TI) effect" which opposes the "revenue recycling (RR) effect" that prior work had noted

Key result: Under central-case assumptions, TI effect is larger than RR effect

- ==> not only is there no double-dividend, but net effect is to make environmental taxes *less* attractive
- Optimal environmental tax < marginal external damage

Key Lessons for Policy

-There is (generally) no free lunch from environmental policy

-Avoid giveaways. The cost of environmental policy is higher (potentially much higher) if government doesn't use revenue in an efficiency-enhancing way (e.g., cut distortionary taxes, provide valuable public goods, etc.)

#### Extending the TI and RR Insights

- -Next wave of papers extend the basic TI and RR insights to other contexts:
  - -Instrument choice: because of RR effect, taxes more efficient than grandfathered permits (Goulder, Parry, Williams, others)
  - -Performance standards may be more efficient than permits because they cause a smaller TI effect (Goulder, Parry, Williams, Fullerton, Metcalf)
  - -If pollution affects health/productivity, benefit-side TI effect (Williams)
  - -International trade: cost of protectionist trade policies is higher because of TI effect (Williams)
  - -Excess burden of commodity taxes much higher than "Harberger Triangle" estimate because of TI effect (Goulder, Williams)
  - -Cost of agricultural policies is higher because of TI effect (Parry)
  - -Fixed resource stock ==> lower TI effect (Bento, Jacobsen)

# Review of the Tax Interaction Literature: Questioning Assumptions

#### -Distributional effects

- -Kaplow shows that in multiple-agent model, optimal tax = MED
- -Williams shows that this result comes from different assumptions about utility function, not from relaxing representative agent assumption

#### -Empirical work

-West and Williams relax assumptions about utility, estimate TI effect for gasoline tax

Result: in this case, TI effect is small or negative ==> optimal tax > MED

## Why I Don't Like "The Double Dividend"

- -Has led to "if two dividends are good, three dividends are even better"
- -Ambiguous: literature talks about <u>the</u> double dividend, but has many different definitions
  - -Strong, intermediate, weak forms
  - -Based on total effects or marginal effects
  - -Evaluated at what point: zero tax? Pigouvian tax? Optimal tax?
  - -Definitions are not equivalent, but many papers imply that they are
- -Almost all of the definitions are irrelevant for finding optimal policy
  - -Most widely used concept strong DD is a search for a free lunch, but environmental policy is worthwhile even if it isn't free

## Promising Avenues for Tax Interaction Research

- -Extend insights into still more contexts
- -Dynamic models
- -More work incorporating distributional effects
- -More empirical work: other goods, other data sets, other methodology