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Heterogeneous Effects of Regulation: A Nonparametric Model of Residential Land Development

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The Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics



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- Recent decades have witnessed a significant increase in the extent of this type of development beyond the urban center (Brown et al., 2005; Irwin and Bockstael, 2007; Nechyba and Walsh, 2004).

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Motivation

- In most urban fringe areas in the U.S. the predominant form of land conversion is in some form of residential development.
- Recent decades have witnessed a significant increase in the extent of this type of development beyond the urban center (Brown et al., 2005; Irwin and Bockstael, 2007; Nechyba and Walsh, 2004).
- While most research has focused on demand, there has been an increase in interest in the importance of supply side factors in influencing housing and land markets(DiPasquale, 1999), including the role of increased regulation (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks, 2005; Murphy, 2010; Ortalo-Magne and Prat, 2007; Quigley and Raphael, 2005).

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Motivation

• Our work extends this latter set of papers and looks, specifically, at the impact of land use regulation on the supply decision of landowner agents and how this effect varies across the landscape.

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Question 1

Do land use regulations affect the likelihood of development?

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Question 1

Do land use regulations affect the likelihood of development?

Question 2

Is the effect of regulation heterogeneous across a spatially differentiated suburban-exurban landscape?

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Study Region: Carroll County, Maryland





History of Land Use Regulation

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- Carroll passed their first comprehensive plan in 1963. It restricted building density outside of public service areas to one house per acre.
- In 1978 the county passed a second extensive land use plan that created a regulatory division between major and minor subdivision developments and the official subdivision regulation process in the county.



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Theory

The Effect of Regulatory Uncertainty on Investment

• The landowner's development decision is modeled as a sequential real option investment decision with uncertainty over input costs (Pindyck, 1993).

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The Effect of Regulatory Uncertainty on Investment

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$$dC = -Idt + \zeta Cdw \tag{1}$$

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$$dC = -Idt + \zeta Cdw \tag{1}$$

$$F(C) = \max_{I(t)} E_0 \left[V e^{-r\tilde{T}} - \int_0^{\tilde{T}} I(t) e^{-rt} dt, 0 \right]$$
(2)

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 Input Cost Uncertainty: Once a person decides to exercise her invest put option the project takes time to complete with the amount of investment in each period, *I*(*t*), determined by 0 ≤ *I*(*t*) ≤ *k*. Motivation Theory Empirical Model Data Results Conclusions Reference

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- Input Cost Uncertainty: Once a person decides to exercise her invest put option the project takes time to complete with the amount of investment in each period, *I*(*t*), determined by 0 ≤ *I*(*t*) ≤ *k*.
- The effect of regulatory uncertainty, *ζ*, is to make the final completion time of the project, *T̃*, uncertain from the perspective of the landowner at the time she starts the project.

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Empirical Model

• In each period, *t*, a landowner, *n*, decides whether or not to start the process of developing her parcel as a residential subdivision development and is assumed to be making an optimal stopping decision at the time of subdivision initiation.

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Empirical Model

- In each period, *t*, a landowner, *n*, decides whether or not to start the process of developing her parcel as a residential subdivision development and is assumed to be making an optimal stopping decision at the time of subdivision initiation.
- This decision is influenced by a set of factors, *X_{nt}*, operating at different spatial and temporal scales: regional, neighborhood, and parcel-level variables and regulatory factors on the parcel, *C_{nt}*, specifically:
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 - Approval Uncertainty.
- Given that subdivision development takes time to complete, each landowner is assumed to form a prediction of expected completion time in each period based on past subdivision approval times.

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Nonparametric Model of Regulatory Uncertainty

 We estimate a nonparametric discrete-time duration model to capture temporal and spatial heterogeneity of landowners' investment decisions. otivation Theory **Empirical Model** Data Results Conclusions References

Nonparametric Model of Regulatory Uncertainty

 We estimate a nonparametric discrete-time duration model to capture temporal and spatial heterogeneity of landowners' investment decisions.

$$Prob(d_{nt} = 1 | X_{nt}, C_{nt}) = h(t | X_{nt}, C_{nt}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(X_{nt}\beta + C_{nt}\alpha + \kappa_{t-10})}}$$
(3)

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$$Prob(d_{nt} = 1 | X_{nt}, C_{nt}) = h(t | X_{nt}, C_{nt}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(X_{nt}\beta + C_{nt}\alpha + \kappa_{t-t0})}}$$
(3)

 Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) show that in the case of discrete-time binary time-series cross-section data a binomial model with logit link and time fixed effects is equivalent to a continuous-time proportional hazard model.

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$$\sum_{i=n}^{n} K_{n} \{ y_{nt} log(P_{nt}) + (1 - y_{nt}) log(1 - P_{nt}) \}$$
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(4)

where P_{nt} is equal to $\frac{exp(X_{nt}\beta+C_{nt}\alpha+\kappa_{t-t0})}{1+exp(X_{nt}\beta+C_{nt}\alpha+\kappa_{t-t0})}$ and K_n , which is the kernel weight for observation n, is equal to $K\left(\frac{Z_n-Z}{h}\right)$.

Motivation	Theory	Empirical Model	Data	Results	Conclusions	References

Nonparametric Model of Regulatory Uncertainty

• The kernel represents the Mahalanobis distance weight from each observation to all other observations that fall within the window for that observation.

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- We use a Gaussian kernel: $(2\pi)^{-.5}e^{\frac{-z^2}{2}}$.

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- The kernel represents the Mahalanobis distance weight from each observation to all other observations that fall within the window for that observation.
- We use a Gaussian kernel: $(2\pi)^{-.5}e^{\frac{-z^2}{2}}$.
- We apply an adaptive bandwidth given the irregular nature of our spatial data.
- We estimate our current model at both the 40% window and 60% window and compare the estimates with those produced by the "global" discrete-time duration model.

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		Data C	Constru	uction		

References

Data Construction

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- A panel data set of historical land development in the county from 1980-2007. This was constructed by backdating ArcGIS shapefiles for land preservation, historical easements, and other types of land use from Maryland Property View data sets.
- A panel data set on residential subdivision approval timing in the county from 1989-2007. This was constructed by matching monthly zoning board data on approvals of subdivisions with our first data set of final subdivision approval gained from the subdivision plat maps.

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Data Creation: Subdivision Plat Example



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Construction of Regulatory Uncertainty Variable

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• To construct our measure of regulatory uncertainty for each parcel in each time period we estimate a two-step conditional survival model in each period and use the estimates from the second stage of the model to predict the expected completion times for each undeveloped parcel in that time period (Prentice, Williams, and Peterson, 1981). tivation Theory Empirical Model Data Results Conclusions Reference

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$$L(\beta_k) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \prod_{k=1}^{2} h_{ik} ((t_{ik1} - t_{ik0}), \beta_{ik})^{d_{ik}} S_{ik} ((t_{ik1} - t_{ik0}), \beta_{ik})^{1 - d_{ik}}$$
(5)

where *k* signifies the stage of the model.

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Predicted Development Times: 1994



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Predicted Development Times: 2002



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Final Data Set										

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• Our data sample consists of all undeveloped and developed parcels in the county from 1995-2007.



Final Data Set

- Our data sample consists of all undeveloped and developed parcels in the county from 1995-2007.
- The final data set contains 46,143 parcel-time observations during this time period on 3,852 parcels. During this time period 410 parcels filed and gained conditional subdivision approval.

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Results of

Discrete Survival Models: Non-Regulatory Factors

-	Nonparametric				Nonpara	ametric		Glo	Global	
		40% V	Vindow			60% W	indow		Discrete	Survival
	Coef.	Std.	Min.	Max.	Coef.	Std.	Min.	Max.	Coef.	Std.
		Dev.				Dev.				Err.
Intercept	-4.615	1.702	-8.690	-0.488	-4.416	1.064	-6.592	-2.229	-4.837	0.980
Non-Regulatory	Factors									
Balt. City	-0.007	0.014	-0.052	0.028	-0.011	0.007	-0.025	0.001	-0.016	0.011
SluTran	0.019	0.020	-0.020	0.076	0.013	0.014	-0.010	0.045	0.011	0.014
SluSubdiv	0.029	0.010	0.008	0.043	0.028	0.008	0.014	0.039	0.029	0.003
SluRes	0.026	0.012	0.000	0.052	0.025	0.008	0.009	0.045	0.026	0.005
SluUDR	-0.044	0.009	-0.062	-0.018	-0.044	0.006	-0.056	-0.030	-0.046	0.004
SluPre	0.007	0.013	-0.025	0.026	0.007	0.008	-0.009	0.017	0.006	0.005
SluPro	-0.250	0.482	-2.833	0.026	-0.037	0.053	-0.241	0.018	0.001	0.014
SluComm	-0.017	0.028	-0.076	0.029	-0.017	0.020	-0.057	0.012	-0.018	0.010
SluInd	-0.006	0.026	-0.077	0.033	-0.007	0.015	-0.043	0.021	0.000	0.016
Area	0.020	0.007	0.006	0.046	0.019	0.003	0.012	0.029	0.017	0.004
AreaSqrd	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Zoned Lt. Yield	0.004	0.003	-0.001	0.009	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.006	0.004	0.001
Exhouse	0.561	0.426	-0.333	1.494	0.509	0.285	0.028	1.116	0.501	0.117
Sewer	0.592	0.464	-0.419	1.397	0.579	0.330	-0.153	1.083	0.408	0.284
Ag. Zoning	0.815	0.528	-0.120	1.657	0.749	0.375	0.156	1.302	0.775	0.156
Type 1 Soil	-0.001	0.010	-0.020	0.022	-0.001	0.007	-0.015	0.012	-0.001	0.004
Type 2 Soil	-0.002	0.009	-0.022	0.017	-0.002	0.006	-0.016	0.008	-0.001	0.004
Slope	-0.003	0.003	-0.009	0.005	-0.003	0.002	-0.006	0.001	-0.002	0.003
Forest Cover	0.006	0.007	-0.007	0.023	0.006	0.005	-0.002	0.017	0.007	0.004
Competition	-0.006	0.003	-0.012	-0.001	-0.005	0.001	-0.007	-0.003	-0.005	0.003
Drift	0.023	0.161	-0.335	0.349	0.012	0.103	-0.218	0.247	0.019	0.069
Volatility	0.095	0.190	-0.405	0.520	0.121	0.097	-0.114	0.359	0.192	0.078

Note: Nonparametric models show standard deviations and ranges of coefficients.

Note: Parametric models show 5% level in red and 10% in blue.

Results of Discrete Survival Models: Regulatory Factors

	l	Nonpara 40% Wi	metric ndow		I	Nonparametric 60% Window				Global Discrete Survival	
	Coef.	Std.	Min.	Max.	Coef.	Std.	Min.	Max.	Coef.	Std.	
		Dev.				Dev.				Err.	
Regulatory Fact	ors										
Reg. Costs	-0.219	0.086	-0.443	-0.083	-0.222	0.055	-0.353	-0.139	-0.211	0.056	
Log-Likelihood	-1852.267				-1923.964				-2086.456		

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N=46143



References

Regulatory Costs: 40% Window Size





References

Regulatory Costs: 60% Window Size



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Concluding Thoughts

• Our results show that regulation uncertainty does reduce the likelihood of development.

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- Our results also show that these results are spatially heterogenous with the effect being more restrictive in rural and urban sections of the county and less so in the exurban areas.
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- These results are consistent with the scattered development pattern and increases in smaller developments outside of areas with public services.

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- Our results show that regulation uncertainty does reduce the likelihood of development.
- Our results also show that these results are spatially heterogenous with the effect being more restrictive in rural and urban sections of the county and less so in the exurban areas.
- These results are consistent with the scattered development pattern and increases in smaller developments outside of areas with public services.
- These findings are important from a policy perspective in that they suggest that the areas most likely to develop are those that were supposed to be the most heavily regulated. Officials could use this result to try and reduce regulations on developers willing to build in areas with public services.

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Thank You

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